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Phenomenologists have always been concerned with the problem of  prejudice. However, 
to appreciate this problem, we need to understand how the phenomenological notion of  
prejudice differs from our everyday use of  the term. Hans-Georg Gadamer defines prejudices 
as pre-judgments, presuppositions that shape our experience. As he puts it, “prejudices are 
biases of  our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience 
something—whereby what we encounter says something to us.” When we characterize 
prejudices in this way—as “simply conditions whereby we experience something”—they 
seem benign (2008, 9). But once we understand that every experience is biased or prejudiced 
in some way, we realize that we may experience things not as they are, but as we already 
believe them to be. To achieve a genuine understanding of  perception, or embodiment, or 
even human existence as such, we need to critically evaluate our own prejudices in order to 
think outside the conceptual frameworks that shape our present understanding (Fernandez 
2017).
In light of  phenomenology’s longstanding concern with prejudice, it should come as no 
surprise that this same concern is found across many branches of  applied phenomenology, 
including the interdisciplinary field of  phenomenological psychopathology. In his founding 
article, “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology,” Karl Jaspers writes:
 
When we were children, we first drew things as we imagined them, 
not as we saw them; so as psychologists and psychopathologists 
we go through a stage where we form our own ideas, in one 
way or another, of  psychic events, and only later acquire an 
unprejudiced direct grasp of  these events as they really are. And 
so this phenomenological attitude is to be acquired only by ever-
repeated effort and by the ever renewed overcoming of  prejudice.  
(1968, 1316)
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We all have an idea of  what we mean when we use concepts like “depressed mood,” 
“attention deficit,” “delusion,” or “hallucination.” But, if  pressed, would we be able to 
describe any of  these phenomena in detail? Do we really understand what it’s like to find 
oneself  in the midst of  a delusion or enveloped in a depressed mood? And, if  not, can we 
claim a genuine understanding of  these concepts?
This is precisely the challenge that phenomenological psychopathologists take on. The 
best work in this field takes up a phenomenon that we think we’re familiar with, reveals 
the confusions that cloud our current understanding, and provides a more nuanced 
characterization based on analyses of  first-person reports. If  we assume that we already 
know what we mean when we use concepts like “delusion” or “depressed mood,” then 
we’ll fail to make any progress toward a genuine understanding of  these conditions. The 
phenomenological attitude that Jaspers refers to is, first and foremost, a critical orientation 
toward the everyday, scientific, and even philosophical prejudices that so easily convince 
us that we know more than we do. Phenomenology is as much about unlearning what we 
thought we knew as it is about the generation of  new knowledge. The new characterizations 
produced by phenomenological psychopathologists are still subject to revision and 
refinement in light of  new evidence and novel interpretations of  existing data. But, by 
unmooring us from our existing prejudices and assumptions, they have the potential to 
provide new insights into the experiences they investigate.
How widely has this critical orientation been applied within the field of  
phenomenological psychopathology? Within this field, the phenomenological attitude is 
most commonly used to critically reflect upon our assumptions about specific signs and 
symptoms. But phenomenologists have also questioned the legitimacy of  current diagnostic 
categories (Ratcliffe 2015), challenged the naturalistic assumptions of  contemporary 
psychiatry (Fuchs 2017), criticized the check-list diagnostic methods of  the DSM’s 
operational approach (Parnas and Bovet 2015), and proposed alternative approaches to 
psychiatric research and classification (Fernandez 2019; Nelson, McGorry, and Fernandez 
forthcoming).
However, there’s another prejudice—deeply rooted in psychiatry—to which 
phenomenologists have paid remarkably little attention (although R. D. Laing is a notable 
exception). We might call this the prejudice of  pathology or, perhaps, the prejudice of  
disorder. The very word “psychopathology” refers to the study of  the suffering psyche. 
And this characterization is borne out in the majority of  classical and contemporary work 
in phenomenological psychopathology, which doesn’t shy away from characterizing the 
conditions it studies as forms of  suffering, distress, or, simply, illness. On the one hand, 
because psychopathology is a subfield of  psychiatry, these characterizations should come 
as no surprise. On the other hand, one may reasonably hope that phenomenologists take a 
more critical, questioning stance toward these characterizations.
But this isn’t a stance that we need to devise all on our own. Proponents of  a variety 
of  political currents—most notably the neurodiversity movement and the mad pride 
movement—have done the difficult work of  criticizing, questioning, and unlearning what 
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so many of  us presume without a second thought. Of  course, not all of  their concerns will 
be of  immediate interest to phenomenologists. But many of  their questions are, at root, 
philosophical. And some of  these questions have immediate methodological implications. 
As phenomenologists, we ought to be concerned if  our prejudices lead us astray from the 
phenomena that we hope to understand. If  these political movements help us identify, 
articulate, and suspend these prejudices, then we ought to embrace them. 
One might object to this proposal by arguing that these movements, being first 
and foremost political, do not provide well-formulated philosophical theories or 
conceptualizations. But this is hardly the case. Philosophers have recently examined the 
discourse of  both the neurodiversity movement and the mad pride movement, extracting and 
articulating their philosophical and theoretical positions (Chapman 2019b; 2020; Rashed 
2019). Moreover, movements such as disability pride have already shaped the philosophy of  
disability (Barnes 2016). And we’re beginning to see similar influences in the philosophy of  
neurodiversity (Chapman 2019a). Drawing on the positions outlined in these works, there 
are two key directions that should be of  immediate interest to phenomenologists. First, they 
push us to conceptualize conditions, or ways of  being, in terms of  diversity or difference, 
rather than disorder. Second, they stress how diagnostic labels are, in many cases, taken up 
as identities. The first direction should motivate phenomenologists to ask questions such 
as, “How does the presumption of  suffering shape how we interpret first-person reports 
of  experience?” and “Have we neglected important aspects of  conditions because we’ve 
already conceptualized them as inherently negative or undesirable?” The second direction, 
on the role of  identity, should motivate phenomenologists to ask questions such as, “What 
does it mean to take autism or schizophrenia not as a diagnosis, but as a social identity?” and 
“How does the shift from an illness narrative to an identity narrative modify experiences of  
self, others, and environment?”
As Jaspers reminds us, the task of  overcoming prejudice requires an ongoing effort. 
Prejudices are often so ingrained in our ways of  thinking and experiencing that they go 
entirely unnoticed. If  we are genuinely committed to identifying, assessing, and suspending 
our prejudices, then we ought to listen to those most affected by them. Their critical 
analyses may allow us to see things in a way that we haven’t seen them before. And it’s 
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